Leading by Words in Privileged Groups

Johannes Weisser
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Johannes Weisser: IMPRS Uncertainty, MPI for Economics, Jena

No 2011-066, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Koukoumelis et al. (2010, 2012) have shown that one-way communication enhances contributions to public goods. We investigate the effectiveness of one-way communication, when the benefits from the public good are asymmetric and the sender of a message is the main beneficiary of cooperation. Our results show that, in the absence of communication opportunities, contribution behavior may be inversely related to other group members' marginal benefits from the public good. The effectiveness of one-way communication, however, remains unaffected even though compliance with a sender's suggestion to cooperate generates unfavorable payoff inequalities for message receivers. The results also indicate that one-way messages have to relate to the experimental game to enhance cooperation. Merely "giving someone a voice" is not sufficient.

Keywords: Public goods; One-way communication; Privileged groups; Asymmetric marginal benefit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D74 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-066

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