Persuasive Silence

Toru Suzuki

No 2012-014, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: In the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the eective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze an eective marketing strategy to persuade an inattentive buyer in an adverse selection environment. We investigate how an attention-grabbing marketing can "backfire" and when it can be eective.

Keywords: Signaling game; Consideration set; Counter signaling; Limited attention; Marketing; Advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D82 D83 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-mkt
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