Accuracy of proposers' beliefs in an allocation-type game

Federica Alberti, Anna Conte and Kei Tsutsui ()
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Kei Tsutsui: Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

No 2014-002, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: In the context of an allocation game, this paper analyses the proposer's reported beliefs about the responder's willingness to accept (or reject) the proposed split of the pie. The proposer's beliefs are elicited via a quadratic scoring rule. An econometric model of the proposer's beliefs is estimated. The estimated proposer's beliefs are then compared with the actual responder's choices. As a result of this comparison, we observe that the proposer tends to underestimate the empirical acceptance probability, especially when the slice of the pie allocated to the proposer is large.

Keywords: Model construction and estimation; Allocation game; Beliefs elicitation and evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 C52 C72 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-002

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