Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game

Astrid Gamba () and Tobias Regner

No 2015-012, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the quality of information feedbacks provided after each play. If subjects rely only on their personal database, long run behavior resembles a Self-confirming equilibrium whereby less pro-social types take at earlier nodes due to prediction errors. Aggregate information release decreases heterogeneity of behavior by increasing the passing rates of pro-selfs and play moves towards Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: social preferences; learning; Self-confirming equilibrium; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game (2015)
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