What drives motivated agents? The 'right' mission or sharing it with the principal
Tobias Regner and
Hannes Koppel
Additional contact information
Hannes Koppel: Alfred Weber Institute of Economics, University of Heidelberg
No 2015-022, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Abstract:
Motivated agents are characterized by increasing their effort if their work generates not only a monetary return for them but also a benefit for a mission they support. While their motivation may stem from working for their preferred (i.e., the `right') mission, it may also be the principal's choice of the right mission (i.e., a mission preference match) that motivates them. We investigate experimentally to what extent these two motivations are driving the effect of a mission on agent effort. We find that agents care not only about the mission as such but also whether the principal shares this mission. Our analysis estimates the additional effect of a mission preference match to be as big as the effect of just working for the right mission. It seems that the full potential of `motivation by mission' is realized only when principals share as well as support the agents' mission, stressing the importance of the economics of identity in labor market settings.
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; experiment; labor market; incentives; principal agent; identity; mission; motivated agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 J01 M14 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-hrm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Journal Article: What drives motivated agents: The ‘right’ mission or sharing it with the principal? (2019) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2015-022
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