Do I care if others lie? Current and future effects of delegation of lying

Serhiy Kandul and Oliver Kirchkamp
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Serhiy Kandul: Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

No 2016-011, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: The aim of this study is to find out why people are telling the truth: is it a desire to respect trust, to avoid losses for others, or a mere distaste for lying per se? To answer this question we study a sender-receiver game where it is possible to delegate the act of lying and where it is possible to take pro-social actions in a subsequent dictator game. We examine how delegation affects the outcomes of people's current and future ethical decisions. We find that a non-trivial fraction of participants delegate their decision. However, delegation is associated with higher transfers in the subsequent dictator game

Keywords: Sender-Receiver games; moral balancing; guilt aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2016-011

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