I win it's fair, you win it's not. Selective heeding of merit in ambiguous settings

Serhiy Kandul and Olexandr Nikolaychuk ()
Additional contact information
Olexandr Nikolaychuk: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany

No 2021-002, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: One's willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether or not the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We manipulate the role allocation procedure in the dictator game to illustrate that this belief is not independent of the outcome and is self-serving in its nature. Our findings suggest that there may be some positive level of dissatisfaction with virtually any social outcome in the populace without there being anything wrong as far as the underlying procedure. We also discuss the perceptions of fairness and merit as potential drivers of the observed behavioral phenomenon.

Keywords: fairness; entitlement; merit; redistribution; procedural preferences; dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2021/wp_2021_002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2021-002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().