Banking competition and welfare

Marcella Lucchetta ()

Annals of Finance, 2017, vol. 13, issue 1, No 2, 53 pages

Abstract: Abstract We develop a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, higher social welfare, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium, they are empirically relevant, and carry significant implications for policy guidance.

Keywords: Banking competition; General equilibrium; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D53 D6 G01 G1 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10436-016-0288-2

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