Does Competition Lead Firms to Bribery? A Firm-Level Study in Southeast Asia
Ruohan Wu ()
Additional contact information
Ruohan Wu: Alabama State University
Atlantic Economic Journal, 2018, vol. 46, issue 1, No 7, 100 pages
Abstract:
Abstract Economists have paid close attention to economic development in Southeast Asia, where corruption and bribery are believed to be ubiquitous. In this article, we study the reasons why firms bribe. Specifically, we study the effects of the competition encountered by Southeast Asian firms on their bribing behavior. This article focuses on two types of bribing behavior: (1) informal payments given to the government so that it will ignore rule violations and (2) informal payments to the government to secure a contract. Using firm-level and country-level data from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam between 2009 and 2014, we find that the market competition will increase bribing behavior, while political competition within the country will reduce the likelihood of bribing.
Keywords: Bribe; Southeast Asia; Firms; Market competition; Political competition; D21; O10; O53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11293-017-9566-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:46:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11293-017-9566-2
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/11293/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s11293-017-9566-2
Access Statistics for this article
Atlantic Economic Journal is currently edited by Kathleen S. Virgo
More articles in Atlantic Economic Journal from Springer, International Atlantic Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().