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Endogenous voting weights for elected representatives and redistricting

Justin Svec and James Hamilton ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2015, vol. 26, issue 4, 434-441

Abstract: This paper analyzes the merits of a novel method of eliminating the power of a gerrymanderer that involves an endogenous weighting system for elected representatives. This endogenous weighting system ties the voting weight of elected representatives in the legislature to the share of the voters who voted for that representative’s party and to the share of representatives elected from that party. If the weights are set correctly, it can be shown in the simple voting model of Gilligan and Matsusaka (Public Choice 100:65–84, 1999 ) that redistricting has no influence on the policy passed by the legislature. In effect, the endogenous weighting system converts a single-member plurality political system into one with proportional representation. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Redistricting; Representative weights; Gerrymander; D72; H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Endogenous Voting Weights for Elected Representatives and Redistricting (2013) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:26:y:2015:i:4:p:434-441

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-015-9196-0

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