The effects of economic development on democratic institutions and repression in non-democratic regimes: theory and evidence

Alexander Kemnitz and Martin Roessler
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Martin Roessler: TU Dresden

Constitutional Political Economy, 2023, vol. 34, issue 2, No 1, 145-164

Abstract: Abstract This paper provides a theoretical rationale for the simultaneous use of repression and democratic institutions by a non-democratic government, as is often observed in reality. We find that economic development has different impacts on the levels of repression and democracy, depending on whether it appears in the form of rises in income or in education: A higher income level reduces democracy, whereas more education leads to both more democracy and more repression. These theoretical implications are corroborated by dynamic panel data regressions.

Keywords: Democracy; Repression; Non-democratic government; Economic development; C33; D72; K38; H11; O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09373-x

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