Does rigidity matter? Constitutional entrenchment and growth

Justin Callais () and Andrew T. Young ()
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Justin Callais: Texas Tech University
Andrew T. Young: Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 53, issue 1, No 2, 27-62

Abstract: Abstract Should procedural barriers to constitutional amendment be more onerous than those to the policy changes of ordinary politics? – i.e., should constitutions be entrenched? One criterion by which to evaluate these questions is economic performance. Using data on countries worldwide and constitutional adoptions from 1973 to 2017, we estimate the effect of constitutional entrenchment (rigidity) on economic growth. We employ matching methods to make causal inferences. The adoption of a constitution that is meaningfully more rigid than its predecessor defines a treatment. In our benchmark estimations (based on 19 treatments), post-treatment effects on growth are generally small and statistically insignificant. However, when we examine a subsample that excludes autocracies (13 treatments), post-treatment effects are always negative and sometimes statistically significant. The same is true when we exclude treatments associated with coups (12 treatments). Contrary to many scholars’ priors, the evidence suggests that, if anything (and based on the limited number of available treatments), greater entrenchment causes less economic growth.

Keywords: Constitutions; Entrenchment; Constitutional rigidity; Constitutional amendments; Political economy; Matching methods; Economic growth; Economic development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O43 P00 P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-021-09715-4

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