Continuous Versus Discrete Time in Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game Experiments

M. Djiguemde, D. Dubois, Alexandre Sauquet and M. Tidball
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M. Djiguemde: Institut Agro
D. Dubois: Institut Agro
M. Tidball: Institut Agro

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2022, vol. 82, issue 4, No 8, 985-1014

Abstract: Abstract We study the impact of discrete versus continuous time on the behavior of agents in the context of a dynamic common pool resource game. To this purpose, we consider a linear quadratic model and conduct a lab experiment in which agents exploit a renewable resource with an infinite horizon. We use a differential game for continuous time and derive its discrete time approximation. In the single agent setting, we fail to detect, on a battery of indicators, any difference between agents’ behavior in discrete and continuous time. Conversely, in the two-player setting, significantly more agents can be classified as myopic and end up with a low resource level in discrete time. Continuous time seems to allow for better cooperation and thus greater sustainability of the resource than does discrete time.

Keywords: Common pool resource; Differential games; Experimental economics; Continuous time; Discrete time; C01; C73; C91; C92; Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: Continuous versus Discrete Time in Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game Experiments (2022)
Working Paper: Continuous versus Discrete Time in Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game Experiments (2022)
Working Paper: Continuous versus Discrete Time in Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game Experiments (2021)
Working Paper: Continuous versus Discrete Time in Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game Experiments (2021)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-022-00700-2

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