On the provision of incentives in finance experiments

Daniel Kleinlercher and Thomas Stöckl ()
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Daniel Kleinlercher: Innsbruck University
Thomas Stöckl: MCI - Management Center Innsbruck, Department Business Administration Online

Experimental Economics, 2018, vol. 21, issue 1, No 7, 154-179

Abstract: Abstract Monetary incentives are a procedural pillar in experimental economics. By applying four distinct monetary incentive schemes in three experimental finance applications, we investigate the impact of an incentive scheme’s salience on results and elicit subjects’ perception of the experienced scheme. We find (1) no differences in results between salient schemes but a significant impact if the incentive scheme is non-salient. (2) The number of previous participations has a significant impact on the perception of the incentive scheme by subjects: it strongly correlates with subjects’ motives for participation, positively contributes to subjects’ understanding of the incentive scheme, but has no influence on subjects’ motivation within the experiment. (3) Subjects favor more salient over less- or non-salient schemes in the gain domain and negatively evaluate high salience in the loss domain.

Keywords: Experimental finance; Incentives; Salience; Asset market; Mispricing; Information aggregation; Investment decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D82 G12 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9530-7

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