Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment

Klaus Abbink and Heike Hennig-Schmidt

Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, issue 2, 103-121

Abstract: This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences with our 18 independent observations per treatment. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects’ interpretation of the task. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006

Keywords: Corruption; Context; Framing; Valence; Experimental Instructions; Laboratory; Trust; Reciprocity; Ethical Behaviour; Social Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (191)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:2:p:103-121

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla (sonal.shukla@springer.com) and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (indexing@springernature.com).