Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Matthias Cinyabuguma (), Talbot Page () and Louis Putterman

Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, issue 3, 265-279

Abstract: Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating “perverse” incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order “perverse” punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006

Keywords: Public goods; Collective action; Experiment; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (126)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z

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