Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: the role of capital ownership

Hikaru Ogawa

International Tax and Public Finance, 2013, vol. 20, issue 3, 474-484

Abstract: This paper extends the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94:768–776, 2010 ), which argues that under capital tax competition the sub-game perfect equilibria (SPEs) correspond to two Stackelberg outcomes. The findings show that the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi result depends on the form of capital ownership. By generalizing the form of capital ownership, this paper shows that the simultaneous-move outcome prevails as an SPE if the capital is owned by residents in the countries, whereas the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi argument holds if the capital is owned by nonresidents. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Tax competition; Endogenous timing; Capital ownership; H30; H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:20:y:2013:i:3:p:474-484

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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-012-9238-8

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