Majority voting and endogenous timing in tax competition

Hikaru Ogawa and Taiki Susa ()
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Taiki Susa: Chubu University

International Tax and Public Finance, 2017, vol. 24, issue 3, No 2, 397-415

Abstract: Abstract We model a timing game in tax competition where the initial capital is unevenly endowed within the country and the tax policies are determined under a majority voting regime. The model is characterized by a novel feature: The decisive voter imports capital at the individual level, while the country exports it at the national level. The paper finds that governments endogenously choose to play a sequential-move game, which is unlikely to associate with full capital ownership in the tax competition literature.

Keywords: Tax competition; Endogenous timing; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H30 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:24:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10797-016-9424-1

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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-016-9424-1

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