Subjective Bayesian beliefs

Constantinos Antoniou (), Glenn Harrison, Morten Lau and Daniel Read ()

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2015, vol. 50, issue 1, 35-54

Abstract: A large literature suggests that many individuals do not apply Bayes’ Rule when making decisions that depend on them correctly pooling prior information and sample data. We replicate and extend a classic experimental study of Bayesian updating from psychology, employing the methods of experimental economics, with careful controls for the confounding effects of risk aversion. Our results show that risk aversion significantly alters inferences on deviations from Bayes’ Rule. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Bayes’ Rule; Subjective beliefs; Learning; D03; D81; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11166-015-9208-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:50:y:2015:i:1:p:35-54

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11166/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11166-015-9208-5

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty is currently edited by W. Kip Viscusi

More articles in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().