Incentive Effects of Rate-of-Return Regulation: The Case of Hong Kong Electric Utilities

Yoram C Peles and Greg Whittred

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1996, vol. 10, issue 1, 99-112

Abstract: A comparison of Hong Kong and United States rate-of-return regulation indicates differences in the definition of the rate base and in the proportion of it permitted a fair rate of return. These differences imply that Hong Kong electric utilities utilize proportionately more fixed (less current) assets, and that these assets are financed proportionately more by equity (less by debt), than their United States counterparts. Our results support both these predictions, providing further evidence that since rate-of-return regulation is implemented by reference to "reported" results, comparatively minor differences in regulatory frameworks can have quite dramatic consequences for utilities' asset structure and financing mix. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
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