Level of access and infrastructure investment in network industries

Marc Bourreau, Pınar Doğan (pinar_dogan@hks.harvard.edu) and Romain Lestage (romain.lestage@cufe.edu.cn)

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2014, vol. 46, issue 3, 237-260

Abstract: In this paper, we study how the terms of access to an incumbent’s infrastructure (i.e., the level of access and price) affect an entrant’s incentives to build its own infrastructure. Setting a high level of access (e.g., a resale arrangement), which requires relatively small up-front investment for entry, accelerates market entry, but at the same time delays the deployment of the entrant’s infrastructure. This is also true for a lower access price. We show that the socially optimal access price can vary non-monotonically with the level of access. We also study the case where access is provided at two different levels, and show that access provision at multiple levels can delay infrastructure building. Finally, we modify our baseline model to allow for experience and/or market share acquisition via access-based entry, and show that high levels of access may accelerate facility-based entry. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Level of access; Infrastructure investment; Network industries; L51; L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Level of access and infrastructure investment in network industries (2014)
Working Paper: Level of Access and Infrastructure Investment in Network Industries
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-014-9253-z

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