The political economy of energy tax differentiation across industries: theory and empirical evidence

Niels Anger (), Christoph Böhringer and Andreas Lange

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2015, vol. 47, issue 1, 78-98

Abstract: We investigate political economy determinants of energy tax differentiation across industries. Based on a theoretical common agency model, we show that differences in the ease of energy demand reductions across industries explain the pattern of tax differentiation: if the government is sufficiently amenable to lobbying efforts, industries with relatively inelastic energy demands will face lower tax rates. An empirical assessment of Germany’s environmental tax reform corroborates the findings of our theoretical analysis. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Energy taxation; Interest groups; Common agency; Regression analysis; C31; D62; H23; P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:47:y:2015:i:1:p:78-98

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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-014-9264-9

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