Competition, vertical relationship and countervailing power in the UK airport industry

Anna Bottasso, Martina Bruno, Maurizio Conti and Claudio Piga
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Martina Bruno: University of Genova

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2017, vol. 52, issue 1, No 3, 37-62

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study whether competition in the airport market and the vertical interactions between upstream airports and downstream airlines influence the airport pricing decisions. Using a panel of the 24 largest UK airports, as well as a refined definition of airports’ market structure, we find that lower concentration in an airport’s catchment area and higher airlines countervailing power are associated to lower aeronautical charges.

Keywords: Airport; Competition; Countervailing power; Vertical relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L93 R40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-017-9332-z

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