How Compatible Are Public Choice and Austrian Political Economy?

Sanford Ikeda

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2003, vol. 16, issue 1, 63-75

Abstract: Public choice relies heavily on equilibrium analysis in its models of government failure. Austrians are suspicious of equilibrium analysis owing to its reliance on some variant of the perfect-knowledge assumption. To what extent then can Austrians consistently embrace public-choice descriptions of government failure? This paper argues that to maintain methodological consistency public choice should jettison the equilibrium, perfect-information framework, while keeping the empirically relevant assumption of narrow political interest. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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