Why is Corruption Tolerated?

Enrico Colombatto ()

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2003, vol. 16, issue 4, 363-379

Abstract: It is maintained that a closer analysis of the features of the underlying contract reveals that under many circumstances corruption is in fact a rational and understandable reaction to institutional failures, which are often far from accidental. Sometimes it can even be considered legitimate, when instrumental in achieving goals shared by the vast majority of the electorate. To this purpose, three different stylized institutional frameworks are analyzed: developed, totalitarian and transition countries. The origin, scope and consequences of corruption vary significantly across the different frameworks. The normative conclusions should therefore be adjusted accordingly. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Keywords: corruption; rent-seeking; discretionary power; institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1027349206371 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:revaec:v:16:y:2003:i:4:p:363-379

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11138/PS2

DOI: 10.1023/A:1027349206371

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Austrian Economics is currently edited by Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne

More articles in The Review of Austrian Economics from Springer, Society for the Development of Austrian Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().