Wither U.S. Net Neutrality Regulation?

Michael Katz ()

Review of Industrial Organization, 2017, vol. 50, issue 4, No 5, 468 pages

Abstract: Abstract I examine the (lack of) economic logic that underlies the U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s latest iteration of network neutrality regulations. I explore potential unintended consequences and find a substantial tension between the regulations and the objective of promoting consumer choice and sovereignty. I also identify market developments that could largely neutralize the regulations unless they are expanded to constrain Internet access providers’ actions further.

Keywords: Regulation; Net neutrality; Internet service providers; Edge providers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9573-0

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