Vertical Restraints, the Sylvania Case, and China’s Antitrust Enforcement

Zhiyong Liu () and Yue Qiao ()
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Zhiyong Liu: Indiana State University
Yue Qiao: Shandong University

Review of Industrial Organization, 2017, vol. 51, issue 2, No 4, 193-215

Abstract: Abstract We briefly review the relevant economic theories and legal treatment of vertical restraints, and especially focus on the 1977 landmark case of Sylvania and its possible influence on China’s antitrust enforcement on vertical restraints. China’s competition policy, and particularly its antimonopoly law, does not explicitly instruct with respect to the enforcement approach (per se versus rule of reason) toward vertical restraints. But from an overview of China’s recent antitrust cases, we find that there is a division in the approaches taken by public versus private enforcement: Even though the administrative enforcement is more inclined to the application of per se prohibitions (or the application of the EU-style prohibition-plus-exemption approach), it seems that a rule of reason is the (increasingly) prevailing approach that is taken by the courts.

Keywords: Vertical restraints; Sylvania; Antitrust; Antitrust enforcement; Competition policy; Per se rule; Rule of reason (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K23 L40 L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9587-7

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