Algorithmic Pricing What Implications for Competition Policy?

Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari (), Vincenzo Denicolo' () and Sergio Pastorello ()
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Sergio Pastorello: University of Bologna

Review of Industrial Organization, 2019, vol. 55, issue 1, No 9, 155-171

Abstract: Abstract Pricing decisions are increasingly in the “hands” of artificial algorithms. Scholars and competition authorities have voiced concerns that those algorithms are capable of sustaining collusive outcomes more effectively than can human decision makers. If this is so, then our traditional policy tools for fighting collusion may have to be reconsidered. We discuss these issues by critically surveying the relevant law, economics, and computer science literature.

Keywords: Algorithmic pricing; Competition policy; Artificial intelligence; Machine learning; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09689-3

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