Decentralization and Consumer Welfare with Substitutes or Complements
Nicolas Pasquier ()
Additional contact information
Nicolas Pasquier: University of Bordeaux
Review of Industrial Organization, 2024, vol. 64, issue 3, No 6, 449-469
Abstract:
Abstract We study a vertically integrated producer (VIP) that supplies a downstream firm under price competition. The VIP may decentralize the final price decision to its downstream unit; the latter thereby ignores the effect of the output price on upstream sales. We find that decentralization benefits the VIP – irrespective of whether the products are substitutes or complements. Decentralization also benefits the consumers when products are substitutes, but it harms them when the products are complements. Interestingly, when products are substitutes, decentralization decreases both output prices despite restoring a double margin on the downstream unit’s sales.
Keywords: Decentralization; Substitutes; Complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L22 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-023-09941-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:revind:v:64:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-023-09941-x
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11151/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09941-x
Access Statistics for this article
Review of Industrial Organization is currently edited by L.J. White
More articles in Review of Industrial Organization from Springer, The Industrial Organization Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().