Marker Systems in Leniency Policies

Konstantinos Charistos ()
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Konstantinos Charistos: University of Ioannina

Review of Industrial Organization, 2024, vol. 65, issue 3, No 6, 745-757

Abstract: Abstract Leniency Programs (LPs) reward cartel-participating firms that come forward with evidence that can be used as proof of the illegal conduct in which they have participated. The marker system allows a leniency applicant to reserve its position in the reporting queue before the names of the eligible applicants are announced. We show that markers can reduce the destabilizing effect of LPs: When cartels are established either with or without a marker system, self-reporting and cartel disruption are less likely with markers, as compared to without markers. In addition, the introduction of markers in LPs may further the sustainability of collusion.

Keywords: Antitrust enforcement; Collusion; Leniency programs; Marker system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L12 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09955-z

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