Economics at the FTC: Non-Horizontal Mergers, the CARS Rule, and the Non-Compete Rule

Alison Hole, Michael LeGower, Michael Lipsitz () and Aviv Nevo
Additional contact information
Alison Hole: Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics
Michael LeGower: Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics
Michael Lipsitz: Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics
Aviv Nevo: Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics

Review of Industrial Organization, 2024, vol. 65, issue 4, No 6, 933-965

Abstract: Abstract The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces federal competition and consumer protection laws that prevent anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices, and works to advance government policies that protect consumers and promote competition. The FTC’s Bureau of Economics performs economic analysis to support the enforcement, rulemaking and policy activities of the Commission. This article discusses several examples of these activities. We first discuss analysis of non-horizontal effects of mergers, as reflected in the 2023 Merger Guidelines and in recent cases. Next, we discuss the economic analysis conducted by the FTC’s economists in two recent rules. We discuss the CARS rule, a rule that aims to increase price transparency and curb misrepresentations in the marketing, sale, and leasing of motor vehicles. We next discuss the non-compete rule, which bans employers from entering into, or attempting to enter into, a non-compete clause with a worker.

Keywords: Antitrust; Consumer protection; FTC; Mergers; Rulemaking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-024-10000-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:revind:v:65:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-024-10000-2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11151/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-10000-2

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Industrial Organization is currently edited by L.J. White

More articles in Review of Industrial Organization from Springer, The Industrial Organization Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().