TARP’s deadbeat banks

Linus Wilson ()

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2013, vol. 41, issue 4, 674 pages

Abstract: This paper tests whether poorly capitalized banks with troubled loan books are more likely to miss their bailout dividends. Privately held banks with weaker core capital ratios, more charged off loans, more allowances for loan losses, and more non-performing loans are more likely to miss their Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) dividends. Banks that issue non-cumulative preferred stock are also more likely to be TARP deadbeats. In addition, banks that missed a bailout dividend in the prior quarter are significantly more likely to miss the next bailout dividend. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Bailout; Banking; Capital Purchase Program; Dividends; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act; Hybrid securities; Preferred stock; SBLF; Small Business Lending Fund; Trust preferred; TRUPS; TARP; G21; G28; G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11156-012-0327-7

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