CEO network centrality and corporate cash holdings

Jose Miranda-Lopez (), Svetlana Orlova () and Li Sun ()
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Jose Miranda-Lopez: University of Tulsa
Svetlana Orlova: University of Tulsa
Li Sun: University of Tulsa

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2019, vol. 53, issue 4, No 2, 967-1003

Abstract: Abstract The social network centrality of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has received tremendous attention in recent research. This study examines how CEO network centrality relates to corporate cash holdings. We find a significant negative relation between CEO network centrality and the level of corporate cash holdings, suggesting that firms with higher-centrality CEOs hold less cash. Our results still hold after a battery of robustness checks.

Keywords: CEO network centrality; Corporate cash holdings; Social network analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G39 M49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11156-018-0772-z

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