Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness

Sususmu Cato ()

Theory and Decision, 2013, vol. 75, issue 4, 563-579

Abstract: This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Arrow’s impossibility theorem; Strong Pareto; Ultrafilter; Conditional decisiveness; Serial dictatorship; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9352-9

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