Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle

Sigbjørn Birkeland () and Bertil Tungodden

Theory and Decision, 2014, vol. 77, issue 1, 125-151

Abstract: In this paper, we study the role of fairness motivation in bargaining. We show that bargaining between two strongly fairness motivated individuals who have different views about what represents a fair division may end in disagreement. Further, by applying the Nash bargaining solution, we study the influence of fairness motivation on the bargaining outcome when an agreement is reached. In particular, we show that the bargaining outcome is sensitive to the fairness motivation of the two individuals, unless they both consider an equal division fair. We argue that our results accommodate existing experimental and field data on bargaining. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Bargaining; Fairness; Disagreement; Nash bargaining solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:77:y:2014:i:1:p:125-151

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9392-1

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