A classification of weakly acyclic games

Krzysztof Apt () and Sunil Simon

Theory and Decision, 2015, vol. 78, issue 4, 524 pages

Abstract: Weakly acyclic games form a natural generalization of the class of games that have the finite improvement property (FIP). In such games one stipulates that from any initial joint strategy some finite improvement path exists. We classify weakly acyclic games using the concept of a scheduler introduced in Simon and Apt (Choosing products in social networks, 2012 ). We also show that finite games that can be solved by the iterated elimination of never best response strategies are weakly acyclic. Finally, we explain how the schedulers allow us to improve the bounds on finding a Nash equilibrium in a weakly acyclic game. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Game theory; Weakly acyclic games; Scheduler; Classification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9436-1

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