Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems

Duygu Nizamogullari () and İpek Özkal-Sanver ()

Theory and Decision, 2015, vol. 79, issue 2, 217-225

Abstract: In this paper, we study consistent enlargement of a solution. By computing it, one actually evaluates the extent to which the solution would have to be expanded in order to be well-defined and consistent. We show that the union of stable matchings and the matching recommended by a single-valued, well-defined, individually rational, and consistent solution is a minimal consistent enlargement of the core. Although individual rationality is sufficient it is not a necessity. Next, we show that for any fixed order on the set of agents in the society, the union of stable matchings and the serial dictatorship matching is a minimal consistent enlargement of the core. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Roommate problems; Core; Consistency; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9470-z

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