Characterizations of weighted and equal division values

Sylvain Béal, André Casajus (), Frank Huettner (), Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal
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André Casajus: LSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches Institut
Frank Huettner: LSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches Institut

Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 80, issue 4, No 7, 649-667

Abstract: Abstract New and recent axioms for cooperative games with transferable utilities are introduced. The non-negative player axiom requires to assign a non-negative payoff to a player that belongs to coalitions with non-negative worth only. The axiom of addition invariance on bi-partitions requires that the payoff vector recommended by a value should not be affected by an identical change in worth of both a coalition and the complementary coalition. The nullified solidarity axiom requires that if a player who becomes null weakly loses (gains) from such a change, then every other player should weakly lose (gain) too. We study the consequence of imposing some of these axioms in addition to some classical axioms. It turns out that the resulting values or set of values have all in common to split efficiently the worth achieved by the grand coalition according to an exogenously given weight vector. As a result, we also obtain new characterizations of the equal division value.

Keywords: Equal division; Weighted division values; Non-negative player; Addition invariance on bi-partitions; Nullified solidarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9519-7

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