Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly

Amparo M. Mármol (), Luisa Monroy (), M. Angeles Caraballo and Asunción Zapata ()
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Amparo M. Mármol: Universidad de Sevilla
Luisa Monroy: Universidad de Sevilla
Asunción Zapata: Universidad de Sevilla

Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 83, issue 3, No 5, 365-383

Abstract: Abstract This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and, therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach allows the incorporation of partial information about the preferences of the agents into the model, and permits the identification of the set of equilibria in accordance with this information. We also propose an additional conservative criterion which can be applied in this framework in order to predict the results of interaction. The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework for the analysis of a wide range of strategic economic models.

Keywords: Non-cooperative games; Vector-valued utility; Equilibria; Preference information; Mixed duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9595-y

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