Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution

Osamu Mori ()
Additional contact information
Osamu Mori: Jobu University

Theory and Decision, 2018, vol. 85, issue 2, No 5, 225-232

Abstract: Abstract We provide two alternative characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution. We introduce new simple axioms, strong undominatedness by the disagreement point, and egalitarian Pareto optimality. First, we prove that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale invariance, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and strong undominatedness by the disagreement point. Second, we replace the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom with the sandwich axiom (Rachmilevitch in Theory Decis 80:427–442, 2016) and egalitarian Pareto optimality. We then demonstrate that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale invariance, strong undominatedness by the disagreement point, the sandwich axiom, and egalitarian Pareto optimality.

Keywords: Nash bargaining solution; Axiomatic characterization; Strong undominatedness by the disagreement point; Sandwich axiom; Egalitarian Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-017-9624-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:85:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9624-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9624-x

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().