Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol

Shiran Rachmilevitch ()
Additional contact information
Shiran Rachmilevitch: University of Haifa

Theory and Decision, 2019, vol. 86, issue 3, No 5, 389-399

Abstract: Abstract Two players bargain to select a utility allocation in some set $$X\subset {\mathbb {R}}_+^2$$ X ⊂ R + 2 . Bargaining takes place in infinite discrete time, where each period t is divided into two sub-periods. In the first sub-period, the players play a simultaneous-move game to determine that period’s proposer, and bargaining takes place in the second sub-period. Rejection triggers a one-period delay and move to $$t+1$$ t + 1 . For every $$x\in X\cap {\mathbb {R}}^2_{++}$$ x ∈ X ∩ R + + 2 , there exists a cutoff $$\delta (x)

Keywords: Bargaining; Endogenous protocol; Folk theorems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-019-09688-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:86:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-019-09688-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09688-6

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().