NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies

Zhe Yang () and Haiqun Zhang
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Zhe Yang: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Haiqun Zhang: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Theory and Decision, 2019, vol. 87, issue 2, No 2, 155-170

Abstract: Abstract Inspired by Scarf (J Econ Theory 3: 169–181, 1971), Zhao (Int J Game Theory 28: 25–34, 1999), Sandholm (Population games and evolutionary dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010) and Yang and Zhang (Optim Lett. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-018-1303-5 , 2018), we introduce the model of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies, and define the notions of NTU core and TU core for coalitional population games. We next prove the existence results for NTU cores and TU cores. Furthermore, as an extension of the NTU core, we introduce the notion of strong equilibria and prove the existence theorem of strong equilibria.

Keywords: Coalitional population game; NTU core; TU core; Strong equilibria; Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09701-y

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