On anonymous and weighted voting systems

Josep Freixas () and Montserrat Pons ()
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Josep Freixas: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (Campus Manresa), EPSEM
Montserrat Pons: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (Campus Manresa), EPSEM

Theory and Decision, 2021, vol. 91, issue 4, No 3, 477-491

Abstract: Abstract Many bodies around the world make their decisions through voting systems in which voters have several options and the collective result also has several options. Many of these voting systems are anonymous, i.e., all voters have an identical role in voting. Anonymous simple voting games, a binary vote for voters and a binary collective decision, can be represented by an easy weighted game, i.e., by means of a quota and an identical weight for the voters. Widely used voting systems of this type are the majority and the unanimity decision rules. In this article, we analyze the case in which voters have two or more voting options and the collective result of the vote has also two or more options. We prove that anonymity implies being representable through a weighted game if and only if the voting options for voters are binary. As a consequence of this result, several significant enumerations are obtained.

Keywords: Decision-making; Multichoice games; Anonymous decision systems; Weighted decision systems; Pseudo-Boolean functions; Enumerations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09814-3

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