Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem

Kazuo Yamaguchi ()
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Kazuo Yamaguchi: Rissho University

Theory and Decision, 2022, vol. 93, issue 1, No 4, 69-104

Abstract: Abstract We consider a spatial bargaining model where players collectively choose a facility location on a two-dimensional rectilinear distance space through bargaining using the unanimity rule. We show that as players become infinitely patient, their stationary subgame perfect equilibrium utilities converge to the utilities that satisfy the lexicographic maximin utility criterion introduced by Sen (Collective choice and social welfare, 1970).

Keywords: Spatial bargaining; Unanimity rule; Rejecter-becomes-proposer protocol; Facility location; Rectilinear distance space; Lexicographic maximin utility criterion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09838-9

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