Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions

Walter Ferrarese and Antoni Rubí-Barceló ()
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Walter Ferrarese: University of the Balearic Islands
Antoni Rubí-Barceló: University of the Balearic Islands

Theory and Decision, 2024, vol. 96, issue 2, No 7, 333-349

Abstract: Abstract We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n-player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of games. We discuss our results in a Cournot game, a contest game, and a public good game.

Keywords: Equilibrium characterization; Symmetric games; Homogeneous functions’ properties; Non-homogeneous revenue function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09952-w

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