Treading a Â…fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara ()

No SDES-2017-14, Working Papers from Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management

Abstract: This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen’s (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, including the individual herself, for which she feels truth-telling concerns. An individual i is honest when she states her true preferences as well as rankings (not necessarily complete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true preferences of individuals in her honesty standard. The paper o¤ers a necessary condition for Nash implementation, called partial-honesty monotonicity, and shows that in an independent domain of preferences that condition is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity.

Keywords: Nash implementation; Partial-honesty; Non-connected honesty standards; Independent domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2017-08, Revised 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in SDE Series, August 2017, pages 1-28

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2017-14.pdf First version, 2017 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2017-14

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sachiko Minami ().