Tax Evasion and Pricing Schemes for Monopolist

Pang Ryong Kim
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Pang Ryong Kim: Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute

Korean Economic Review, 1997, vol. 13, issue 2, 111-121

Abstract: This paper analyzes some aspects of decision making of a tax-evading monop-olistic firm facing a uniform pricing and two part tariffs. It is shown that an im-position of tax, in the former case. is expected to increase social welfare, while the reverse is true in the latter. On the other hand, in both tariffs, it is also shown that an imposition of tax increases the output level and does not change the fraction of over-repored cost while if the penalty fee is imposed on the firm, it decreases the fraction of over-reported cast as well as the firm's output level.

Keywords: Tax Evasion; Uniform Pricing; Two-part-Tariffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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