Lobbies Competition and Bilateral International Environmental Agreements

Geum Soo Kim
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Geum Soo Kim: Hoseo University

Korean Economic Review, 2013, vol. 29, 81-96

Abstract: This paper analyzes two small open economies that share a natural environment and consider an environmental agreement between them. The two governments do not merely maximize general welfare in their respective countries, but also pick a policy partially in response to their internal “functionally specialized†industrial and environmental lobbies. This paper provides the conditions under which an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) between those two countries could be achieved in a subgame-perfect equilibrium with or without special interests’ pressures.

Keywords: Political Economy; IEA; Lobby; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H87 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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