Punishment-Dominance Condition on Stable Two-Sided Matching Algorithms

Takuya Masuzawa
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Takuya Masuzawa: Faculty of Economics, Keio University

No 2012-018, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series from Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program

Abstract: In this article, we consider a many-to-one two-sided matching market and define a canonical strategic form game, in which any worker applies to the top k firms and is assigned to the most preferred firm that does not reject him/her. Under the substitute property of firms' preferences, the game satisfies the punishment-dominance condition. The deferred-acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley (Amer. Math. Monthly 69: 1962), which finds the maximum and minimum of stable matchings, is described as an instance of the algorithm by Masuzawa (Int. Jour. Game Theory 38: 2008), which determines the α-cores of the strategic form games with the punishment-dominance condition.

Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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