When is a sequential school choice system (non-)deficient?

Tetsutaro Hatakeyama
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Tetsutaro Hatakeyama: Graduate School of Economics, Keio University

No 2023-012, Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University

Abstract: We study sequential assignment systems in which objects are assigned to agents in multiple stages. While such systems are prevalent in real-life school choice and college admissions, Dur and Kesten (2019) show that these systems are neither non-wasteful nor straightforward in general. To overcome this negative observation, we consider a model in which the mechanism designer chooses an allocation schedule, i.e., in which stage to allocate each object, as well as the allocation mechanisms it uses within a system. Our analysis newly reveals that (i) in general, no allocation schedules avoid wastefulness/non-straightforwardness and (ii) a nonwasteful/straightforward allocation schedule exists if and only if the preference domain is "tiered." This result supports practices in which the tiered domain naturally arises (e.g., Chinese college admissions practice). However, this also highlights the difficulty of sequential assignments in more diverse preference domains.

Keywords: sequential assignment system; non-wastefulness; straightforwardness; tiered domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D61 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2023-07-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ure
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